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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In April of 2002, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit published 
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a decision in the matter of Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc.1  The 
decision was an important precedent in the application of the 35 U.S.C. 
§ 112 written description requirement for patents on genetic material.  
The holding was unremarkable and followed logically from the Federal 
Circuit’s previous application of the written description requirement to 
DNA patents.2  What was surprising was that by July 2002, in a rare 
example of a court’s overruling itself, the court had reversed its April 
2002 decision.3  The subsequent decision was, in many aspects, a 
fundamental departure not only from the prior holding but also from 
recent decisions relating to the written description requirement.4  Of 
particular interest in the second ruling were the following: the court’s 
unusual reliance on the Patent and Trademark Office Guidelines (PTO 
Guidelines) rather than prior case law, the allowance of a biological 
deposit as sufficient for compliance with the written description 
requirement, the possible allowance of a description by function, and a 
new articulation of the written description requirement as more than a 
showing of possession.  This Article will examine the recent history of 
the ways in which courts have applied the written description 
requirement to gene patents with a particular focus on the changes in the 
law wrought by the Enzo decision. 
II.  THE WRITTEN DESCRIPTION REQUIREMENT 
The United States patent system functions on the rationale of quid pro 
quo, by which the law grants a temporary monopoly on the production 
and use of an invention in exchange for the knowledge of the invention’s  
being made public.5  This quid pro quo depends upon the inventor’s 
providing adequate disclosure of the invention, which includes a written 
description of the invention6 and information on how to make and use 
it.7  In order to ensure adequate disclosure, the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 
§ 112 requires that a patent application disclose a written description of 
the following: the invention, how to make and use the invention, and the 
best mode for use of the invention.8  This written description aspect of   
 
 1. 285 F.3d 1013 (Fed. Cir.), vacated by 296 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 2. See infra text accompanying notes 71–77. 
 3. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 296 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 4. See infra Part IV.B. 
 5. DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 7.01 (2002). 
 6. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 131 (1996). 
 7. CHISUM, supra note 5, § 7.01. 
 8. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).  Paragraph one states: 
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of 
the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and 
exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or 
with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set 
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§ 112 is commonly referred to as the “written description requirement.”9 
The written description requirement originated with the Patent Act of 
1790,10 which required that each patent have “a specification in writing, 
containing a description.”11  Because certain aspects of the Patent Act of 
1790 were perceived as inefficient,12 it was replaced just three years later 
by the similarly titled Patent Act of 1793.13  The new act slightly 
modified the language of the written description requirement14 by 
requiring a party that wished to obtain a patent to “deliver a written 
description of his invention, in such full, clear and exact terms, as to 
distinguish the same from all other things before known, and to enable 
any person skilled in the art or science . . . to make, compound and use the 
same.”15  In 1822, the U.S. Supreme Court in Evans v. Eaton construed 
this language as containing two separate requirements.16  In modern usage, 
these requirements are known as the enablement requirement and the 
written description requirement.17  The Court stated that the objective of 
the written description requirement is “to put the public in possession of 
what the party claims as his own invention.”18  The Court also determined 
that the written description must define the limits of what had been 
patented, explaining that the inventor “ought to describe what his own 
 
forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention. 
Id. 
 9. Williams v. Gen. Surgical Innovations, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 2d 698, 704 (E.D. 
Tex. 2002).  “[T]he three requirements of  § 112 . . . in patent law parlance are 
commonly referred to as the written description requirement, the enablement 
requirement, and the best mode requirement.”  Id. 
 10. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 2, 2 Stat. 109 (1790) (repealed 1793). 
 11. Id. at 110. 
 12. Amusingly, the Patent Act of 1790 required the Secretary of State, the 
Secretary for the Department of War, and the Attorney General to examine every patent 
petition and vote as to whether it was “sufficiently useful and important.”  E.C. 
Walterscheid, Thomas Jefferson and the Patent Act of 1793, 40 ESSAYS IN HIST. 3 
(1998), at http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/journals/EH/EH40/walter40.html.  If the Patent 
Act of 1790 were still in effect today, Colin Powell, Donald Rumsfeld, and John 
Aschroft would be required to examine and vote on all patents. 
 13. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 3, 2 Stat. 318, 321–22 (1793) (repealed 1836). 
 14. See, e.g., Lisa A. Karczewski, Comment, Biotechnological Gene Patent 
Applications: The Implications of the USPTO Written Description Requirement 
Guidelines on the Biotechnology Industry, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1043, 1061 (2000). 
 15. Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356, 433 (1822) (quoting Patent Act of 
1793 § 3) (alterations in original). 
 16. Id. at 433–34. 
 17. CHISUM, supra note 5, §§ 7.03–.04. 
 18. Evans, 20 U.S. at 434. 
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improvement is, and to limit his patent to such improvement.”19 
After Evans, courts began to develop the practice of drafting central 
claims that succinctly state what has been invented and define the limits 
of the invention with reference to more substantial descriptions 
contained elsewhere within the application.20  The Patent Act of 1836 
codified this practice of drafting claims.21  After 1836, the importance of 
claims continued to increase although the written description was still 
considered the central feature of the patent document.22  Ultimately, the 
role of the written description in delineating the limits of the invention 
was usurped entirely by the use of claims with the Patent Act of 1870.23  
Stripped of its role of defining the limits of the patent, the written 
description requirement became a historical anachronism for almost one 
hundred years until it was resurrected by In re Ruschig 24 in 1967. 25  In 
Ruschig, the court used the written description not to determine the 
limits of the patent, but to ascertain whether the patent conveyed “clearly to 
those skilled in the art” that the inventor had invented what was claimed.26 
Since Ruschig, the understanding that the written description 
requirement “must clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to 
recognize that [the inventor] invented what is claimed” has endured.27  
Ruschig’s conceptualization of the purpose of the written description 
requirement has evolved in the common law into a specific test: In order 
to satisfy the requirement, the application must describe the invention 
with adequate specificity to allow a person skilled in the art to know that 
the inventor had been in possession of the claimed subject matter at the 
time of the application.28  Until Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc.,29 
 
 19. Id. at 435. 
 20. Janice M. Mueller, The Evolving Application of the Written Description 
Requirement to Biotechnological Inventions, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 615, 619–20 (1998). 
 21. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 5, 1 Stat. 117, 119 (repealed 1870).  When the 
practice of claims drafting was codified by the Patent Act of 1836, “it was understood as 
merely codifying the existing law which had been developed by the courts.”  Karl B. 
Lutz, Evolution of the Claims of U.S. Patents, 20 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 134, 143 (1938); Craig 
Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 12 n.50 (2000). 
 22. See, e.g., Jason M. Okun, Note, To Thine Own Claim Be True: The Federal 
Circuit Disaster in Exxon Chemical Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1335, 1344 (2000). 
 23. Zhibin Ren, Note, Confusing Reasoning, Right Result: The Written Description 
Requirement and Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Company, 1999 
WIS. L. REV. 1297, 1301 (1999). 
 24. 379 F.2d 990 (C.C.P.A. 1967). 
 25. Janice M. Mueller, The Evolving Application of the Written Description 
Requirement to Biotechnological Inventions, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 615, 620 (1998). 
 26. Ruschig, 379 F.2d at 996. 
 27. Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1562–63 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (quoting 
In re Gosteli, 872 F.2d 1008, 1012 (Fed. Cir. 1989)); see infra text accompanying note 121. 
 28. Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 29. 285 F.3d 1013 (Fed. Cir.), vacated by 296 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
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recent case law had continually reinforced the understanding that, as 
applied to patents on genetic material, the written description requirement 
was satisfied by a showing of possession.30 
III.  THE RECENT CASE LAW 
Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co.31 was one of the earliest 
cases to influence the evolution of the written description requirement 
for patenting genetic material.  In Amgen, the plaintiff alleged that 
Genetics Institute, in collaboration with Chugai Pharmaceuticals, had 
infringed a patent held by Amgen that claimed the nucleotide sequence 
that expressed human erythropoitien (EPO), a protein that stimulates the 
production of red blood cells.32  The Amgen patent claimed “[a] purified 
and isolated DNA sequence consisting essentially of a DNA sequence 
encoding human [EPO].”33  Genetics Institute argued that it had been the 
first to invent the disputed nucleotide sequence because it had conceived 
a method for the isolation of the DNA for EPO prior to Amgen.34  The 
court found that, although Genetics Institute had conceived of a potential 
method for isolating the EPO gene prior to the Amgen patent, the 
company did not have “an adequate conception of the DNA sequence.”35  
The court further noted that the inventor for Genetics Institute did not 
have adequate conception at the time of application because “he did not 
then know the sequence of the gene encoding EPO.”36  The court held 
that “when an inventor is unable to envision the detailed constitution of 
a gene so as to distinguish it from other materials, as well as a method 
 
 30. See infra Part III. 
 31. 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 32. Id. at 1203. 
 33. Id. at 1204.  Genetic information is stored in DNA in the form of a sequence of 
nucleotide bases, either adenine, thymine, cytosine, or guanine.  Each nucleotide will 
only recognize its complementary base, so that adenine complements thymine and 
cytosine complements guanine.  The nucleotides are organized in codons, sequences of 
three base molecules that each correspond to a specific amino acid.  The sequence of 
codons in a gene therefore only codes for the sequence of amino acids in the protein.  In 
order for a protein to be expressed by the host organism, the genetic information 
contained in its strand of DNA is first transcribed to a strand of complementary 
messenger RNA (mRNA).  The mRNA is then  “translated” or read by tRNA molecules 
in the ribosome, leading to the assembly of the corresponding amino acid sequence and 
expression of the protein product.  See OFFICE OF HEALTH & ENVTL. RESEARCH, U.S. 
DEP’T OF ENERGY, PRIMER ON MOLECULAR GENETICS 6–9 (1992). 
 34. Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1205. 
 35. Id. at 1207. 
 36. Id. 
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for obtaining it, conception has not been achieved until reduction to 
practice has occurred, i.e., until after the gene has been isolated.”37  Stated 
in other terms, Amgen allowed two methods of conception of a gene: (1) 
actual knowledge of the nucleotide sequence sufficient to distinguish it 
from others with a method for obtaining it, or (2) actual isolation of the 
gene.38 
The requirements for conception articulated in Amgen were joined 
specifically to the written description requirement for patents on genetic 
material in Fiers v. Revel.39  In Fiers, three separate inventors all 
claimed patent rights to DNA encoding “human fibroblast beta-
interferon [], a protein that promotes viral resistance in human tissue.”40  
The Fiers court applied the conception standards for DNA patents that had 
been defined in Amgen directly to the written description requirement by 
stating, “one cannot describe what one has not conceived.”41  The court 
understood Amgen to hold that “conception of a DNA, like conception of 
any chemical substance, requires a definition of that substance other than 
by its functional utility.”42  The clear implication was that one could not 
adequately describe a DNA by its function.43  According to the Fiers 
court, conception required a description based on “structure, formula, 
chemical name, or physical properties.”44 
The Fiers court also emphasized that the written description must 
establish that the inventor had been in possession of the claimed DNA at 
the time of the patent application.45  The court specified criterion for 
 
 37. Id. at 1206. 
 38. Although the Amgen decision discusses “conception” rather than the “written 
description requirement,” this decision relates to the written description requirement 
because the concept of conception essentially stood as a proxy for the more commonly 
used term of “possession.”  Establishment of possession is the purpose of the modern 
written description requirement.  This connection is articulated by Fiers v. Revel, 984 
F.2d 1164, 1170–71 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  See infra text accompanying notes 34–43. 
 39. 984 F.2d 1164. 
 40. Id. at 1166.  Fiers was an interference involving three groups of foreign 
inventors: Walter C. Fiers of the United Kingdom; Michel Revel and Pierre Tiollais of 
Israel; and Haruo Sugano, Masami Muramatsu, and Tadatsugu Taniguchi of Japan.  Id. 
at 1166–67.  All three groups sought priority for their patent applications based on the 
filing date of the foreign patent applications they filed in their respective countries.  Id. 
 41. Id. at 1171. 
 42. Id. at 1169. 
 43. Id. at 1171.  In reference to a description that purported to cover all DNA that 
coded for beta-interferon, the court held, “Claiming all DNA’s that achieve a result 
without defining what means will do so is not in compliance with the description 
requirement; it is an attempt to preempt the future before it has arrived.”  Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 1170.  The court stated that the patent board had correctly set forth the 
legal standard for sufficiency of description.  Id.  The patent board had held: 
[W]hat is needed to meet the description requirement will necessarily vary 
depending on the nature of the invention claimed. The test for sufficiency of 
support is whether the disclosure of the application relied upon “reasonably 
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establishing possession, stating that “[a]n adequate written description of 
DNA requires more than a mere statement that it is part of the invention 
and reference to a potential method for isolating it; what is required is a 
description of the DNA itself.”46  Ultimately, the Fiers court awarded 
patent rights to the one inventor of the three who had described the exact 
nucleotide sequence of the DNA.47  Although the court did not state that 
the written description requirement required an inventor to disclose the 
exact nucleotide sequence, the facts of the case tended to support that 
interpretation.48 
Prior to Enzo, the last case to define the written description 
requirement as it relates to patents on genetic material is Regents of the 
University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co.49  In Eli Lilly, the court 
invalidated a University of California-owned patent, which claimed a 
prokaryotic host containing insulin encoding DNA for mammals, 
vertebrates, or humans, for failure to satisfy the written description 
requirement.50  The patent described the nucleotide sequence for insulin 
DNA in a rat, but described the rest of the genus, including human, only 
by function.51  Citing Fiers, the court held that a description of the 
 
conveys to the artisan that the inventor had possession at that time of the later 
claimed subject matter.” 
Id.  The court rejected the patent application of Revel because the description did not 
establish possession.  Id. at 1171.  “A bare reference to a DNA with a statement that it 
can be obtained by reverse transcription is not a description; it does not indicate that 
Revel was in possession of the DNA.”  Id. 
 46. Id. at 1170. 
 47. Id. at 1172.  The court gave priority to Haruo Sugano, Masami Muramatsu, 
and Tadatsugu Taniguchi of Japan, stating: 
We also conclude that Sugano’s application satisfies the written description 
requirement since it sets forth the complete and correct nucleotide sequence of 
a DNA coding for ß-IF and thus “convey[s] with reasonable clarity to those 
skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, [Sugano] was in possession 
of the [DNA coding for ß-IF].” 
Id. (quoting Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1991)) 
(alterations in original). 
 48. The conclusion that a description of the nucleotide sequence of a DNA patent 
was required by the holding in Fiers is supported by the fact that all three patent 
applications disclosed a means of isolating the DNA, but priority was granted to the one 
patent that actually described the nucleotide sequence.  Id.  The court clearly stated that 
to fulfill the written description requirement, a plan for isolating the DNA was not 
enough, holding that “what is required is a description of the DNA itself.”  Id. at 1170.  
The court gave no indication of what would suffice as a “description of the DNA itself” 
except description of the nucleotide sequence.  Id. at 1172. 
 49. 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 50. Id. at 1562. 
 51. Id. at 1567.  Although the University of California patent did provide a general 
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DNA’s function was not sufficient, stating that “definition by 
function . . . is only a definition of a useful result rather than a definition 
of what achieves that result.”52 
Eli Lilly also seemed to further establish the rule that a DNA can only 
be described by a recitation of the nucleotide sequence.53  The court in 
Eli Lilly understood Fiers as requiring “[the] kind of specificity usually 
achieved by means of the recitation of the sequence of nucleotides that 
make up the cDNA.”54  In terms of patenting a genus, the court stated: 
A description of a genus of cDNAs may be achieved by means of a recitation of a 
representative number of cDNAs, defined by nucleotide sequence, falling within 
the scope of the genus or of a recitation of structural features common to the 
members of the genus, which features constitute a substantial portion of the genus.55 
In other words, the applicant must disclose the entire sequence of a 
sufficient number of cDNA’s to represent the entire genus or a 
substantial portion of the nucleotide sequence for every member of the 
genus.  Beyond that, the court refused to speculate about other ways by 
which DNA could be properly described.56 
After Eli Lilly, a wide variety of commentators anticipated that a 
recitation of the exact nucleotide sequence was now necessary to fulfill 
the written description requirement for patents on genetic material.57  
Although the court in Eli Lilly did not explicitly adopt a bright-line rule 
that disclosure of the nucleotide sequence was required, the wording of 
the case effectively left disclosure of the sequence, or at least large 
portions of the sequence, as the only certain option.  In the exact 
 
method for obtaining the cDNA that encodes for human insulin, the court did not 
consider it to be a written description of the DNA itself, but rather a potential disclosure 
of enablement.  Id.  The cDNA itself was only described by the protein that it encoded, 
which is a description by function.  Id. at 1568. 
 52. Id.  (citing Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1169–71). 
 53. See, e.g., Courtney J. Miller, Comment, Patent Law and Human Genomics, 26 
CAP. U. L. REV. 893, 917 (1997).  “The decision in Lilly appears to foreclose any further 
gene claims methods other than disclosure of the actual gene sequence.”  Id. 
 54. Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1569. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 53, at 917 (“The decision in Lilly appears to 
foreclose any further gene claims methods other than disclosure of the actual gene 
sequence.”); Margaret Sampson, Comment, The Evolution of the Enablement and 
Written Description Requirements Under 35 U.S.C. § 112 in the Area of Biotechnology, 
15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1233, 1259 (2000); Emanuel Vacchiano, Comment, It’s a 
Wonderful Genome: The Written-Description Requirement Protects the Human Genome 
from Overly-Broad Patents, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 805, 817 (1999); Dorothy R. Auth, 
Are ESTs Patentable?, 15 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 911, 912 (1997) (stating that the 
Lilly decision “suggests that the new standard for the written description requirement—at 
least in the courts—may well be that sequences claimed must be provided in the 
specification”); Eliot Marshall, Courts Take a Narrow View of UC’s Claims, 277 
SCIENCE 1029, 1029 (1997). 
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wording of the court, “An adequate written description of a DNA . . . 
‘requires a precise definition, such as by structure, formula, chemical 
name, or physical properties,’ not a mere wish or plan for obtaining the 
claimed chemical invention.”58  This wording essentially narrows the 
options to disclosing the nucleotide sequence, because DNA has no 
distinctive structure, formula, chemical name, or physical properties 
other than its nucleotide sequence.59  DNA is a molecule comprised of a 
double helix structure formed by complementary base pairs of 
nucleotides.60  What distinguishes one DNA from another is the pattern 
of the nucleic acids that form the complementary base pairs of the 
double helix structure.61  As a result, any request for a description of 
DNA sufficient to distinguish it from other DNA, without relying on 
function, is almost ipso facto asking for the nucleotide sequence.62 
IV.  ENZO BIOCHEM, INC. V. GEN-PROBE INC. 
In Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc.,63 Enzo Biochem sued the 
defendants, Gen-Probe, Chugai Pharmaceutical, Biomerieux, and Becton 
Dickinson, for violation of Enzo’s patent, which claimed nucleic acid 
probes that selectively hybridize to Neisseria gonorrhoeae, the genetic 
material of the bacteria that causes gonorrhea, over Neisseria 
meningitidis.64  Detection of gonorrhoeae is difficult because N. 
gonorrhoeae has between eighty and ninety-three percent homology 
 
 58. Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1566 (quoting Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1171 (Fed. 
Cir. 1993)). 
 59. OFFICE OF HEALTH & ENVTL. RESEARCH, supra note 33, at 6. 
 60. J.D. Watson & F.H.C. Crick, A Structure for Deoxyribose Nucleic Acid, 171 
NATURE 737, 737 (1953). 
 61. DONALD VOET & JUDITH G. VOET, BIOCHEMISTRY 793–804 (1990).  Although 
there are levels of complexity to the structure of DNA that extend beyond the basic 
double helix structure, those elements are related to the storage and regulation of DNA 
within the cell.  J.R. Pollack & V.R. Iyer, Characterizing the Physical Genome, 32 
NATURE GENETICS 515, 515-21 (2002).  It is unlikely that those portions of the DNA will 
be used for patentable subject matter. 
 62. One suggested alternative is to describe a DNA sequence by its number of 
bases coupled with a detailed restriction map.  See Mark J. Stewart, Note, The Written 
Description Requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112(1): The Standard After Regents of the 
University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 32 IND. L. REV. 537, 555 (1999).  However, 
this method provides very little descriptive information concerning the DNA and will 
probably not suffice to fulfill the written description requirement. See Ex parte Maizel, 
27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1662, 1664–65 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. 1992) (discussing certain 
descriptive terms which were found to be inadequate). 
 63. 285 F.3d 1013 (Fed. Cir.), vacated by 296 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 64. Id. at 1015–16. 
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with Neisseria meningitidis; as a result, any probe capable of detecting 
N. gonorrhoeae might also show a positive result when only N. meningitidis 
is present.65  Enzo believed that because its probes exhibited a selective 
hybridization ratio of greater than fifty, they would “hybridize to 
virtually all strains of Neisseria gonorrhoeae and to no strain of 
Neisseria meningitidis.”66  Enzo had deposited these “probes in the form 
of a recombinant DNA molecule within an E. coli bacterial host at the 
American Type Culture Collection.”67  The Enzo patent claimed the 
three deposited sequences and all sequences with a preferential 
hybridization ratio of Neisseria gonorrhoeae over Neisseria meningitidis 
greater than five to one.68  The Enzo specification described the 
invention only by reference to the deposited sequences and by their 
preferential-hybridization ratio.69  The defendants moved for summary 
judgment, arguing that Enzo’s patent failed to meet the 35 U.S.C. § 112 
written description requirement as a matter of law.70 
A.  The First Enzo Decision 
In its original holding, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
clearly articulated the position that an invention may not be described by 
its function in order to fulfill § 112’s written description requirement.71  
Basing its decision largely on Eli Lilly, the court held that “[a] 
description of what the genetic material does, rather than of what it is, 
does not suffice.”72  The court further stated that, “an adequate written 
description of genetic material ‘requires a precise definition, such as by 
structure, formula, chemical name, or physical properties, not a mere 
wish or plan for obtaining the claimed chemical invention.’”73  The court 
did not see a distinction between describing a DNA by protein 
expression and describing a DNA by hybridization, as both were 
descriptions by function.74  As a result, the court held that the Enzo 
claims were insufficiently described as a matter of law.75  In continuing 
 
 65. Id. at 1015. 
 66. Id. at 1016. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 1018. 
 72. Id. (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1568 
(Fed. Cir. 1997)). 
 73. Id. (quoting Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1568) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 74. Id. at 1018–19. 
 75. Id. at 1018.  In contrast to the holding of the court, the dissenting opinion by 
Dyk argued that the real issue was not whether a nucleotide sequence could be described 
by its function, but rather whether “one skilled in the art at the time the application was 
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with the rule that a DNA patent can not be described by its function, the 
court was in accord with its previous holdings in Fiers76 and Eli Lilly.77 
Enzo argued that it had complied with the written description 
requirement because the company had actually reduced the invention to 
practice and had deposited the resulting sequence78 in a public 
repository.79  This would seem a plausible argument in light of Amgen, 
Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co.80 because deposit in a repository 
would necessitate isolation of the claimed gene.  In Amgen, as discussed 
above, the court had allowed two methods of establishing conception: 
(1) actual knowledge of the nucleotide sequence sufficient to distinguish 
it from others plus a method for obtaining it, or (2) actual reduction of 
the nucleotide sequence to practice, which in that case would have 
entailed isolation of the gene.81  The language in Amgen was imported to 
the written description requirement in Fiers82 and later echoed in Eli 
Lilly.83  Surprisingly, the court admitted that reduction to practice may 
 
filed would understand the nature of the claimed invention from the written description.”  
Id. at 1024.  The author of the dissenting opinion felt that, although the invention was 
described by its function, it identified a structural difference between the DNA of N. 
gonorrhoeae and N. meningitidis.  Id. at 1026.  Furthermore, this was sufficient 
information about the structure that it might have been “at least somewhat known to 
those of skill in the art.”  Id.  Because a patent is presumed valid, the dissenter felt that 
this was sufficient to raise an issue of fact and overcome summary judgment.  Id. 
 76. Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 77. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1575; see also 
Ex parte Maizel, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1662, 1667 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. 1992) (“As 
we view it, appellants’ description of the protein solely in terms of its biological 
function . . . is insufficient to . . . place appellants in ‘possession’ [of the DNA 
sequence].”).  
 78. “A deposit is a sample of biological material, needed to practice an invention, 
that is given to a recognized depository so that after the patent issues anyone who wishes 
to practice the invention will have access to the material.”  Heidi L. Kraus, Article, A 
Different New Matter Standard for Biotechnology Patent Applications Accompanied by a 
Deposit, 25 AIPLA Q.J. 101, 112 (1997). 
 79. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 285 F.3d 1013, 1020 (Fed. Cir.), 
vacated by 296 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 80. 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 81. Id. at 1206. 
 82. The Fiers court took the language from Amgen that referred to when an 
invention had been conceived and applied it directly to the written description 
requirement, holding, “As we stated in Amgen and reaffirmed above . . . [i]f a conception 
of a DNA requires a precise definition, such as by structure, formula, chemical name, or 
physical properties, as we have held, then a description also requires that degree of 
specificity.”  Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 83. Eli Lilly quoted the same phrase that Fiers attributed to Amgen, holding, “An 
adequate description of a DNA . . . ‘requires a precise definition, such as by structure, 
formula, chemical name, or physical properties’ . . . .”  Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. 
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establish possession,84 yet found that a showing of possession was not 
enough.85  The court held that, in addition to showing possession, the 
written description must adequately describe the claimed invention so 
that a person skilled in the art could “visualize or recognize the identity 
of the claimed subject matter.”86  This holding is unusual and without 
precedent in the case law, and it is apparently founded on a novel 
interpretation of the statute alone.  In regard to the deposit, the court held 
that “to require the public to go to a public depository and perform 
experiments to identify an invention is not consistent with the statutory 
requirement to describe one’s invention in the specification . . . .  ‘[A] 
deposit is not a substitute for a written description of the claimed 
invention.’”87 
By continuing to disallow describing a DNA patent by its function, 
and by disallowing a description by reference to a deposit, the original 
Enzo holding met the expectations of those who had understood the 
previous rulings in Fiers and Eli Lilly to require disclosure of the 
nucleotide sequence of the claimed DNA.88 
B.  The Second Enzo Decision 
Subsequent to its first review of the case, the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit allowed a rehearing and came to some very different 
conclusions.89  The court overruled its previous holding in two key areas.  
First, the court held that a patent may be described by its function if a 
known correlation between function and structure exists.90  Second, the 
court ruled that the written description requirement may be satisfied by 
 
Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (quoting Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1171). 
 84. Enzo, 285 F.3d at 1023.  “Although an actual reduction to practice, assuming 
one exists here, may demonstrate possession of an embodiment of an invention, it does 
not necessarily describe what the claimed invention is.”  Id. 
 85. Id. at 1020–21. 
 86. Id. at 1021. 
 87. Id. at 1021–22 (quoting Guidelines for Examination of Patent Application 
Under the 35 U.S.C. 112, ¶ 1, “Written Description” Requirement, 66 Fed. Reg. 1099, 
11007–08 n.6 (Jan. 5, 2001)); see also Deposit of Biological Materials for Patent 
Purposes, 54 Fed. Reg. 34,864 (Aug. 22, 1989) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1)  
(“Where the invention involves a biological material and words alone cannot sufficiently 
describe how to make and use the invention in a reproducible or repeatable manner, 
access to the biological material is necessary for the satisfaction of the statutory 
requirements for patentability under 35 U.S.C. 112.”). 
 88. See supra note 52. 
 89. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 296 F.3d 1316, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 90. The court adopted the position of the PTO that the written description 
requirement can be met by “functional characteristics when coupled with a known or 
disclosed correlation between function and structure . . . .”  Id. at 1324 (quoting  
Guidelines for Examination of Patent Application Under the 35 U.S.C. 112, ¶ 1, “Written 
Description” Requirement, 66 Fed. Reg. at 1106). 
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reference in the specification to a deposit of the genetic material in a 
public depository when the practical difficulties of describing the genetic 
material make a written description unavailable.91  In keeping with their 
first decision, the court continued to hold that compliance with the 
written description requirement is not fulfilled simply by disclosing 
enough descriptive information to allow a person reasonably skilled in 
the art to know that the inventor was in possession of the claimed 
invention at the time of application.92  In addition, the applicant must 
also disclose enough descriptive information to adequately describe or 
identify the invention.93 
1.  Analysis of the Second Enzo Decision 
a.  Description by Function 
In its second review of Enzo Biochem v. Gen-Probe Inc., the court 
acknowledged the prior precedent of Eli Lilly in finding that when gene 
material “has been defined only by a statement of function or result . . . 
such a statement alone did not adequately describe the claimed 
invention.”94  The court also acknowledged Fiers v. Revel, which it 
quoted for the rule that an adequate written description “‘requires a 
precise definition, such as by structure, formula, chemical name, or 
physical properties,’ not a mere wish or plan for obtaining the claimed 
chemical invention.”95  However, unlike its previous holding, the court 
did not find that these cases amounted to a rule that a nucleotide 
sequence may not be defined by its function; rather the court oppositely 
concluded: “It is not correct, however, that all functional descriptions of 
genetic material fail to meet the written description requirement.”96  It is 
difficult to imagine a more contrary rule that could have been 
constructed based on the cited precedent.  Rather, the court seems to 
have based its conclusion not on those prior holdings, but purely on the 
 
 91. Id. at 1325.  “[W]e hold that reference in the specification to a deposit in a 
public depository . . . when it is not otherwise available in written form, constitutes an 
adequate description . . . .”  Id. 
 92. Id. at 1329. 
 93. Id. at 1330. 
 94. Id. at 1324 (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 
1559, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). 
 95. Id. (quoting Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1566 (quoting Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 
1171 (Fed Cir. 1993))). 
 96. Id. 
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persuasive authority of the PTO Written Description Guidelines.97  Legal 
inconsistencies not withstanding, the court held: 
In its Guidelines, the PTO has determined that the written description 
requirement can be met by “show[ing] that an invention is complete by 
disclosure of sufficiently detailed, relevant identifying characteristics . . . i.e., 
complete or partial structure, other physical and/or chemical properties, 
functional characteristics when coupled with a known or disclosed correlation 
between function and structure, or some combination of such 
characteristics.” . . . Thus, under the Guidelines, the written description 
requirement would be met for all of the claims of the ‘659 patent if the 
functional characteristic of preferential binding to N. gonorrhoeae over N. 
meningitidis were coupled with a disclosed correlation between that function 
and a structure that is sufficiently known or disclosed.  We are persuaded by the 
Guidelines on this point and adopt the PTO’s applicable standard for 
determining compliance with the written description requirement.98 
Outside the Guidelines, the court cited no authority for this change of 
position.99  According to the explicit phrasing given by the court, the 
written description requirement can be met with a description by 
function when there is a known correlation between function and 
structure.100  At first blush, this holding merely appears to be a simple 
exception to the rule set forth in cases disallowing descriptions of DNA 
by function; however, the court does not clarify exactly how exact the 
correlation between the function and structure must be or how much 
descriptive information that known correlation must yield.101  Because 
the structure of DNA is entirely concerned with storage, transmission, 
and transfer of genetic information,102 and because it is generally known 
how the structure of DNA relates to its function,103 it could be argued 
that there is always some known correlation between function and 
structure although that known correlation might be extremely vague.  
This leaves the holding open to an overly broad interpretation.  It might 
be a different matter had the court narrowly tailored the exception to 
situations in which the specification describes stringent hybridization 
ratios to a disclosed substrate, but the court did not adopt that 
 
 97. Id. at 1325. 
 98. Id. at 1324–25 (final emphasis added) (citations omitted) (internal quotation 
alterations in original). 
 99. The court’s understanding of the Guidelines here sharply contrasts with that of 
its prior decision.  In the first hearing, Enzo had argued that the binding affinity of their 
sequences was a sufficient description under the Guidelines.  Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. 
Gen-Probe Inc., 285 F.3d 1013, 1019 (Fed. Cir.), vacated by 296 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 
2002).  In response, the court pointed out that the Guidelines were not binding and 
stated,  “The Guidelines do not provide that a nucleotide sequence may be defined only 
by its function.”  Id. 
 100. Enzo, 296 F.3d at 1324–25. 
 101. Id. 
 102. VOET & VOET, supra note 61, at 791–93. 
 103. Id. 
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approach.104  Under the current phrasing of the Enzo decision, there is a 
risk that the new exception will swallow the old rule that a description 
by function does not suffice. 
Allowing a description by function when the known correlation 
between function and structure is vague will undoubtedly prove to be 
unworkable.  Whether the function is protein expression or hybridization, 
patents that describe the subject matter by function will always be open 
to the criticism that they are nothing more than a wish105 or an attempt to 
preempt the future106 and patents that offer a description by function 
with a known correlation to the structure of the DNA where that 
correlation is vague will be open to the same criticism.  As a result, it is 
unlikely that courts will allow description by function unless the 
correlation is very specific, such as when the claimed sequence 
demonstrates a strict hybridization ration to a known sequence.  Courts 
will likely distinguish Enzo on its facts and understand Enzo’s statement 
that a description by function will suffice when there is a known 
correlation to structure to be mere dicta and not a statement essential to 
the holding.  Based on the facts of the case and the relevant portions of 
the Guidelines upon which the court relied,107 the courts should 
understand Enzo to mean that description by function can contribute to 
the description of a DNA molecule when combined with other relevant 
information such as a reference to a deposit, partial structure, or physical 
properties, which would allow a person skilled in the art to know that the 
inventor had been in possession of the claimed invention.  Of course, 
any description by function will be complicated by the curious addition, 
beyond a showing of possession, that the Enzo court added to the written 
description.108 
 
 104. Enzo, 296 F.3d at 1327–28. 
 105. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566 (Fed. 
Cir. 1997).  “[A]n adequate written description [of genetic material] ‘requires a precise 
definition, such as by structure, formula, chemical name, or physical properties,’ not a 
mere wish or plan for obtaining the claimed chemical invention.’”  Id. (quoting Fiers v. 
Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). 
 106. See Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“Claiming . . . a 
result without defining what means will do so is not in compliance with the description 
requirement; it is an attempt to preempt the future before it has arrived.”). 
 107. Enzo, 296 F.3d at 1324 (citing Guidelines for Examination of Patent 
Application Under the 35 U.S.C. 112, ¶ 1, “Written Description” Requirement, 66 Fed. 
Reg. 1099, 1106 (Jan. 5, 2001)). 
 108. Id. at 1330. 
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b.  A Demonstration of Possession Is Insufficient for the Written 
Description Requirement 
In the second Enzo decision, the court continued with its holding from 
the original Enzo decision that a demonstration of possession was not 
sufficient to meet the written description requirement.109  The court’s 
ruling in this matter is problematic.  To begin with, the holding was 
based upon an erroneous reading of Lockwood v. American Airlines, 
Inc.110  The Enzo court falsely stated that the Lockwood court had 
rejected the rule that “all that is necessary to satisfy the description 
requirement is to show that one is ‘in possession’ of the invention.”111  
In fact, Lockwood had upheld this rule.112  The Enzo court misinterpreted 
Lockwood as requiring, in addition to a showing of possession, a 
“disclosure of ‘such descriptive means as words, structures, figures, 
diagrams, formulas, etc., that fully set forth the claimed invention.’”113  
A correct reading of Lockwood is that possession is demonstrated by the 
disclosure of sufficiently descriptive words, not that the descriptive 
words are a requirement in addition to showing possession.114 
Additionally, the notion that something beyond a showing of 
possession is necessary to meet the written description requirement is 
not consistent with the court’s prior decisions.115  It has been understood 
by both the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the Patent and 
Trademark Office that the written description requirement for genetic 
and biotechnology patents demanded greater specificity to demonstrate 
possession than other arts;116 however, it has been understood as a 
 
 109. The first decision held that a showing of possession was insufficient.  Enzo 
Biochem v. Gen-Probe Inc., 285 F.3d 1013, 1020–21 (Fed. Cir.), vacated by 296 F.3d 
1316 (Fed. Cir. 2002).  The vacating decision took an identical position, holding, 
“Application of the written description requirement, however, is not subsumed by the 
‘possession’ inquiry.”  Enzo, 296 F.3d at 1330. 
 110. 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). 
 111. Enzo, 285 F.3d at 1020–21 (quoting Lockwood, 107 F.3d at 1572). 
 112. The court noted, “Lockwood argues that all that is necessary to satisfy the 
description requirement is to show that one is ‘in possession’ of the invention.  
Lockwood accurately states the test . . . .”  Lockwood, 107 F.3d at 1572 (citing Vas-Cath 
Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563–64 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). 
 113. Enzo, 296 F.3d at 1329 (citing Lockwood, 107 F.3d at 1572). 
 114. See Lockwood, 107 F.3d at 1572.  “‘The applicant must also convey to those 
skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the 
invention . . . .’  One does that by such descriptive means as words, structures, figures, 
diagrams, formulas, etc.”  Id. (citing Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1563–64) 
 115. See, e.g., Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1563–64. 
 116. See, e.g., Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1170 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (adopting the 
Patent and Trademark Office Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences argument that 
“what is needed to meet the description requirement will necessarily vary depending on 
the nature of the invention claimed”); Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications 
Under the 35 U.S.C. 112, ¶ 1, “Written Description” Requirement, 66 Fed. Reg. 1099, 
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heightened requirement to demonstrate possession,117 not as a 
requirement in addition to a demonstration of possession.118  Until the 
first Enzo decision,119 the case law overwhelmingly had indicated that 
the purpose of the written description requirement was to show 
possession at the time of application.120  The Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit treated this topic in some depth in Vas-Cath Inc. v. 
Mahurkar, in which the court observed: 
   Since its inception, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has frequently 
addressed the “written description” requirement of § 112.  A fairly uniform 
standard for determining compliance with the “written description” requirement 
has been maintained throughout: “ . . . The description must clearly allow persons of 
ordinary skill in the art to recognize that [he or she] invented what is claimed.”121 
The court continued, “[T]he test for sufficiency of support in a parent 
application is whether the disclosure of the application relied upon 
reasonably conveys to the artisan that the inventor had possession at that 
time of the later claimed subject matter.”122 
In acknowledging the understanding of the prior case law as explained 
in Vas-Cath, the Enzo court suggested that the “possession” test was 
“especially meaningful” in cases of later-filed claims.123 As a result, the 
implication seemed to be that the possession test had not been the rule in 
cases that did not involve later-filed claims.124  The court dared not press 
this point too hard though, as the possession test had been applied to 
original claims in Eli Lilly.125  Rather, the court made the point that 
 
1106 (Jan. 5, 2001) (codifying that “for inventions in emerging and unpredictable 
technologies, or for inventions characterized by factors not reasonably predictable which are 
known to one of ordinary skill in the art, more evidence is required to show possession”). 
 117. Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1170–71. 
 118. Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1563–64. 
 119. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 296 F.3d 1316, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 120. See, e.g., Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1563–64. 
 121. Id. at 1562–63 (quoting In re Gosteli, 872 F.2d 1008, 1012 (Fed. Cir. 1989)) 
(second alteration in original). 
 122. Id. at 1563 (quoting Ralston Purina Co. v. Far-Mar-Co, Inc., 772 F.2d 1570, 
1575 (Fed. Cir. 1985)) (internal quotations omitted). 
 123. Enzo, 296 F.3d at 1329. 
 124. Interestingly, it was the view of many commentators that it was inappropriate 
to apply the written description analysis to originally filed claim, this view was 
disappointed by the holding in Eli Lilly.  See, e.g., Ren, supra note 23, at 1312. 
 125. Although the court in Eli Lilly did not specifically say it was applying the 
possession test, it did.  The court articulated the functional equivalent of the “possession” 
test by stating, “To fulfill the written description requirement, a patent specification must 
describe an invention and do so in sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can clearly 
conclude that ‘the inventor invented the claimed invention.’”  Regents of the Univ. of 
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while the question of showing possession has been viewed as the only 
test in cases involving later-filed claims, it is not the only test in which 
original claims are involved.126  Although this position had never before 
been articulated, it is true that the vast majority of written description 
cases have involved later-filed claims.127  This left open the possibility, 
or at least the plausible legal fiction, that an additional requirement has 
quietly existed all along without an opportunity to be explicitly stated. 
The idea that the written description requirement may entail 
something more than a mere showing of possession is neither without 
some logical basis nor unanticipated, but the particular rationale used by 
the Enzo court for introducing an additional requirement is novel.  
Esteemed commentators have held the view that the written description 
requirement not only serves to show possession of the invention, but 
also serves a second purpose of giving “the public notice of the limits of 
the patent in order to allow third parties to improve on and invent around 
the patent without infringing.”128  This view of the written description, as 
describing a limit to the scope of the patent, is actually a throwback to 
the role that the written description requirement filled prior to the Patent 
Act of 1870.129  As cases preceding Enzo relating to genetic patents130 
began to require what was perceived as a higher degree of precision in 
describing genetic patents,131 an enlarged view of the written description 
requirement seemed to possess an almost subliminal presence in the 
decisions.  Commentators began to see as subtext that the written 
description requirement was being used to limit the scope of the 
 
Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (quoting Lockwood v. Am. 
Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).  The court further cited to 
Lockwood, which specifically stated the “possession” test.  Id.; Lockwood, 107 F.3d at 1572. 
 126. Enzo, 296 F.3d at 1329. 
 127. See, e.g., Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1560 (“The cases indicate that the ‘written 
description’ requirement most often comes into play where claims not presented in the 
application when filed are presented thereafter.”). 
 128. Alison E. Cantor, Article, Using the Written Description and Enablement 
Requirements to Limit Biotechnology Patents, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 267, 282 (2000). 
 129. See Mueller, supra note 25, at 619–20.  “Absent claims as we know them 
today, the written description provided notice to the public of the scope of exclusive 
rights asserted by an inventor.  Through the written description, the public was to be ‘put 
in possession’ of the boundaries of a patentee’s asserted monopoly.”  Id.  After the 
Patent Act of 1870, claims were used to define the limits of a patent and the written 
description requirement became a historic anachronism until the modern use of the 
requirement was established in In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d 990 (C.C.P.A. 1967).  Id. at 620. 
 130. See, e.g., Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1569; Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1170 (Fed. 
Cir. 1993). 
 131. In general, the standard for fulfillment of the written description requirement 
for DNA-related patents and biotechnology patents is typically higher than for other 
technological fields.  See Cynthia M. Lambert, Note, Gentry Gallery and the Written 
Description Requirement, 7 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 109, 122 (2001). 
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patent.132  In Enzo, limiting the scope of the patent was not in the court’s 
contemplation.  The court’s view is predicated on the concept that 
“description is the quid pro quo of the patent system; the public must 
receive meaningful disclosure in exchange for being excluded from 
practicing the invention for a limited period of time.”133  It appears that, 
unlike previous conceptualizations of the written description 
requirement, this new understanding has no utility other than as 
description for description’s sake.134  Whereas previous requirements 
required that the invention described show the inventor had actually 
invented and was in possession of the invention,135 or describe the limits 
of the claimed invention,136 this new requirement only requires that the 
invention be described.137  As to what will suffice for an adequate 
description, it is clear that the court intends to require essentially the 
same amount of descriptive information as was required to establish 
possession in Fiers and Eli Lilly,138 with two exceptions: the option of 
showing possession by reduction to practice as indicated in Amgen139 is 
eliminated as not being descriptive enough,140 and, in at least some 
instances, the court will allow a reference in the specification to deposit 
in a public repository.141 
c.  The Use of a Deposit to Fulfill the Written                                  
Description Requirement 
The Enzo court’s allowance of a deposit to fulfill the written 
description is interesting, because the court did not allow the written 
description to be fulfilled by reduction to practice; according to the 
court, reduction to practice only establishes possession,142 which is 
 
 132. See, e.g., Cantor, supra note 128, at 296–97; Vacchiano, supra note 57, at 824–25. 
 133. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 296 F.3d 1316, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 134. “A showing of ‘possession’ is ancillary to the statutory mandate that ‘[t]he 
specification shall contain a written description of the invention,’ and that requirement is 
not met if, despite a showing of possession, the specification does not adequately 
describe the claimed invention.”  Id. (alteration in original). 
 135. See, e.g., Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 136. See, e.g., Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356, 433 (1822). 
 137. See Enzo, 296 F.3d at 1330. 
 138. See id. at 1324 (citing Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1993)); 
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 139. 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 140. See Enzo, 296 F.3d at 1330. 
 141. See id. at 1325. 
 142. Id. at 1329. 
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insufficient to adequately describe the invention.143  The court found that 
a DNA invention can be adequately described in two ways: by a written 
description of its relevant structure or physical characteristics144 or, in 
some instances, the isolated sequence can be deposited in a public 
repository and a reference to the deposit made in the specification.145  
This holding is slightly incongruous because a deposit is very similar to 
reduction to practice and is primarily useful for establishing possession, 
not describing the invention.146 
The court left open the question as to when a reference to a deposit 
will be accepted to satisfy the written description requirement.147  The 
language of the holding was not precise, and it may be argued that 
reference to a deposit to meet the written description requirement is not 
limited to occasions in which the written description is unavailable.  The 
exact phrasing of the court was as follows: “[W]e have concluded that 
reference in the specification to a deposit may also satisfy the written 
description requirement with respect to a claimed material.”148  On its 
face, that statement does not require that the written description be 
unavailable.  The context of the statement, however, makes it appear that 
the court intended to limit the use of a reference to a deposit to cases in 
which the written description is unavailable.149  In laying out the rule, 
the court drew an analogy between the use of a deposit for the written 
description requirement and the use of a deposit to disclose 
enablement.150  In the latter situation, a deposit is allowed only when the 
inventions cannot reasonably be enabled by descriptions in written 
form.151  Additionally, the court noted that the structures of the claimed 
composition “may not have been reasonably obtainable and in any event 
were not known to Enzo when it filed its application in 1986.”152  The 
court also noted that it would have taken an estimated “3,000 scientists 
one month” to sequence the deposited material, which would make a 
 
 143. Id.  The court noted that the argument that “all that is necessary to satisfy the 
description requirement is to show that one is ‘in possession’ of the invention” had been  
rejected in Lockwood.  Id. (quoting Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 
1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). 
 144. Id. at 1324. 
 145. Id. at 1326.  “[R]eference in the specification to deposits of nucleotide 
sequences describe those sequences sufficiently to the public for the purposes of meeting 
the written description requirement.”  Id. 
 146. In re Argoudelis, 434 F.2d 1390, 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1970). 
 147. See Enzo, 296 F.3d at 1326–27.  The ruling does appear to limit the use of a 
deposit to instances where the invention “cannot reasonably be enabled by a description 
in written form.”  Id. at 1326. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 1325–26. 
 151. Id. at 1326. 
 152. Id. 
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written description of the composition “unduly burdensome.”153  Still, 
the language is not as exact as it could be, and it leaves open the issue as 
to the exact standards to determine whether providing a written 
description is unduly burdensome, or whether a written description is 
unavailable as a practical matter. 
2.  Reliance on the Guidelines 
Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the Enzo court’s decision was 
the unprecedented reliance on the Guidelines.154  Although only time 
will reveal its full impact, the decision potentially represents a shift in 
patent law jurisprudence of tectonic proportions.  The decision extends 
well beyond the written description requirement and could affect 
virtually every area of patent law.  Prior to the second Enzo decision, the 
Federal Circuit had never relied upon or even taken judicial notice of the 
Guidelines.155  It is true that courts have taken judicial notice of the 
Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) as an official 
interpretation of regulations on procedural issues.156  However, taking 
notice of the MPEP does not adequately compare with taking notice of 
the Guidelines, as the MPEP and the Guidelines play vastly different 
roles in patent practice and law. 
Patent lawyers and agents frequently use the MPEP in advising 
applicants and in preparing filings.157  Patent examiners often cite 
 
 153. Id. at 1328. 
 154. Besides the Guidelines, the court did make reference to “the history of 
biological deposits for patent purposes, the goals of the patent law, and the practical 
difficulties of describing unique biological materials.”  Id. at 1325.  These references are 
all very general and almost completely amorphous.  For example, the history of 
biological deposits does not suggest anything like the rule formed in the latest Enzo 
decision.  As the court pointed out, the previous status of a deposit had been that “[a]n 
accession number and deposit date add nothing to the written description of the invention.”  
Id. (quoting In re Lundak, 773 F.2d 1216, 1217 (Fed. Cir. 1985)) (alteration in original). 
 155. See Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 285 F.3d 1013, 1019 (Fed. Cir.), 
vacated by 296 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see also Enzo, 296 F.3d at 1324. 
 156. Refac Int’l, Ltd. v. Lotus Dev. Corp., 81 F.3d 1576, 1584 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1996).  
“The MPEP does not have the force and effect of law; however, it is entitled to judicial 
notice as the agency’s official interpretation of statutes or regulations, provided that it is 
not in conflict with the statutes or regulations.”  Id. 
 157. “The Manual is published to provide U.S. Patent and Trademark Office patent 
examiners, applicants, attorneys, agents, and representatives of applicants with a 
reference work on the practices and procedures relative to the prosecution of patent 
applications before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.”  U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK 
OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE (8th ed. 2001 & Rev. 2003), 
available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/mpep.htm. 
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provisions of the MPEP in their communications with patent applicants, 
and the MPEP is understood to be the official interpretation of 
procedural requirements at the PTO.158  For these reasons, the courts 
have held that patent applicants should be able to rely on the MPEP in 
good faith, and courts have taken judicial notice of it as the official 
interpretation of procedural regulations.159  In contrast, the Guidelines 
are intended to be a restatement of policy as enforced by the courts in 
assisting Patent Office personnel in their review of patent applications.160  
The Guidelines are drafted for internal use, and are not intended to be 
actual legal authority that patent attorneys may rely upon for the 
substantive requirements of a patent.161  Rarely cited by the courts, the 
Guidelines have often been in conflict with the decisions of the courts 
and are periodically modified to conform to recent case law.162 
For patent applicants to claim that they relied upon the MPEP is a 
completely different argument than a claim that inventors had relied 
upon the Guidelines.  The Enzo court did note that judicial notice of the 
Guidelines can only be taken “to the extent [the Guidelines] do not 
conflict with the statute.”163  However, because the meaning of statutes 
is left to the interpretation of the judiciary,164 judicial notice of the 
 
 158. See, e.g., In re Kaghan, 387 F.2d 398, 401 (C.C.P.A. 1967). 
   While the MPEP is primarily published for internal use, it is also made 
available to patent applicants and their lawyers as well as to the general public 
through the Superintendent of Documents.  We take judicial notice of the fact 
that the manual is used frequently by patent lawyers and agents in advising 
applicants and in preparing their various papers for filing in the Patent Office, 
and also of the fact that examiners frequently cite provisions of the manual in 
their communications with patent applicants. 
Id. 
 159. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue Labs., 90 F. Supp. 2d 522, 536 n.7 
(D.N.J. 2000). 
 160. “These Guidelines will be used by USPTO personnel in their review of patent 
applications for compliance with the ‘written description’ requirement of 35 U.S.C. 112, 
¶ 1 . . . . These Guidelines reflect the current understanding of the USPTO regarding the 
written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. 112, ¶ 1, and are applicable to all 
technologies.”  Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications Under the 35 U.S.C. 
112, ¶ 1, “Written Description” Requirement, 66 Fed. Reg. 1099, 1099 (Jan. 5, 2001). 
 161. Id.  (“Because these Guidelines only govern internal practices, they are exempt 
from notice and comment rulemaking . . . .”). 
 162. See, e.g., Atmel Corp. v. Info. Storage Devices, 198 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 
1999); AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 
1999); In re Trovato, 60 F.3d 807, 808 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. 
Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 148 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1011–12 (N.D. Cal. 2001).  But see 
State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 927 F. Supp. 502, 512 (D. Mass. 
1996), rev’d, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).  In Signature, the federal court for the 
District of Massachusetts relied upon PTO guidelines stating: “the Guidelines may be 
persuasive authority.”  Id.  The court was later reversed in State Street Bank & Trust Co. 
v. Signature Financial Group, 149 F.3d 1368, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 163. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 296 F.3d 1316, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 164. See Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 461 (2002) (“Our role is to 
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Guidelines should only be observed to the extent that the Guidelines do not 
conflict with the courts’ understanding of statutes.165  To use the Guidelines 
to give a construction to the written description requirement contrary to 
that previously observed by the courts is to give legislative authority to 
the PTO and violate the better traditions of stare decisis.166  Because it 
has always been understood by the courts, until now, that case law controls, 
future litigants will be less certain of the means by which the Federal 
Circuit Court of Appeals will remedy the tension between the Guidelines 
and case law.  As a result, future outcomes will be less predictable. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The latest Enzo decision has clarified some issues, but ultimately 
leaves the § 112 written description requirement for genetic patents in a 
continued state of uncertainty.  It is clear that a DNA can be described 
by its function in certain instances, but it is not clear what those 
instances are, except that stringent hybridization ratios to a disclosed 
substrate will probably suffice.167  It is also clear that a reference to a 
deposit can adequately describe a DNA; however, it is not certain 
whether that will suffice only when the practical difficulties of 
describing the genetic material make a written description unavailable, 
or if it will be allowed on every occasion.168  The Enzo court probably 
intended to allow a reference to a deposit only in cases in which the 
written description is unavailable, but the court did not inform the public 
when the procurement of the written description is so unduly 
burdensome that the practical difficulties make the written description 
unavailable.169  Finally, the court based its holding upon the persuasive 
 
interpret the language of the statute enacted by Congress.”). 
 165. Refac Int’l, Ltd. v. Lotus Dev. Corp., 81 F.3d 1576, 1584 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 166. See EDGAR BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE: THE PHILOSOPHY AND METHOD OF 
THE LAW (rev. ed. 1974). 
   Stare decisis is the most commonly used term for designating the Anglo-
American doctrine of precedent.  This term is an abbreviation of the Latin 
phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere (to stand by precedents and not 
disturb settled points).  Stated in a general form, stare decisis signifies that 
when a point of law has been once settled by a judicial decision, it forms a 
precedent which is not to be departed from afterward.  Differently expressed, a 
prior case, being directly in point, must be followed in a subsequent case. 
Id. at 425. 
 167. See supra Part IV.B.1.a. 
 168. See supra Part IV.B.1.c. 
 169. See supra text accompanying notes 150–54. 
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authority of the patent Guidelines and reached a conclusion in striking 
contrast to legal precedent.170  This newfound willingness to rely upon 
the Guidelines leaves future litigants guessing as to whether they should 
expect either the Guidelines or the previous case law to hold sway in 
future decisions.171  In sum, the latest Enzo decision has shifted the 
direction of the development of the written description requirement for 
DNA patents, but it has also left us with even more uncertainty in the 
law than before the ruling. 
 
 
 170. See supra Part IV.B.2. 
 171. See supra text accompanying notes 164–67. 
